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Abstract
To satisfy the growing need for efficient supply chain orchestration, a Cross
Chain Control Center (4-C) might be an effective concept. A 4-C is a cen-
ter from which multiple supply chains are controlled simultaneously, thereby
aiming to exploit synergetic potential. This article proposes optimization ap-
proaches for transport timetabling and vehicle routing of multiple shippers
that are controlled by a 4-C. We associate inconvenience with the require-
ment that shippers typically need to deviate from their individual schedules
in order to make collaboration possible. This brings up a natural trade-off
between inconvenience and transportation costs, which forms the essence of
the proposed optimization models. Next, we pay attention to a fair redis-
tribution of exploited synergy to the collaborating shippers. By considering
several test cases, we find perfectly intuitively clear results supporting the
applicability of this new approach to supply chain collaboration.
Keywords: Supply Chain Collaboration, Integer programming, Logistics,
Routing, Scheduling, Game theory
1. Introduction
1.1. Problem setting
Due to continued globalization and a growing social demand for sustain-
able logistical activities, supply chains are becoming more comprehensive
and complex. As a consequence, there is a growing need for efficient sup-
ply chain orchestration and configuration. The committee van Laarhoven –
on behalf of the dutch logistics and supply chain industry – has identified
today’s inability to fulfill this need as an opportunity to enhance the in-
ternational logistical position of the Netherlands (Commitee van Laarhoven,
2009). In fact, the committee set the ambition: “by 2020, let the Netherlands
become European market leader in managing and controlling transnational
product flows”, which boils down to a 200% increase of added value of chain
orchestration and configuration.
In this respect, the committee van Laarhoven recognized the importance
of Cross Chain Control Centers (4-C) in reaching the aforementioned am-
bition. A 4-C is able to “control multiple supply chains simultaneously by
means of modern technology and top professionals in logistics” (Committee
van Laarhoven, 2007). A common managerial approach to the movement
of commodities, financial assets and information of multiple supply chains
ought to result in significant costs savings and more environmental friendly
logistical solutions.
As far as supply chain collaboration is concerned, a 4-C balances on the
interface between vertical and horizontal collaboration. The former referring
to collaboration between entities of the same supply chain, e.g. retailers or
suppliers, while the latter includes cooperation of two or more unrelated or
competing companies, e.g. in sharing transport or storage capacity, (Barratt,
2004). In literature, the notion of lateral collaboration is adopted to describe
the concurrence of both vertical and horizontal collaboration (Simatupang
and Sridharan, 2002). Some notable examples of lateral collaboration include
Lean Logistics and Nistevo (Leavitt, 2000). These generally apply a tendering
approach to make schedules of carriers and shippers compatible, and hence,
are operational in nature. Different from this, a 4-C operates on the tactical
and strategical level and attempts to establish long-term agreements among
collaborating shippers. This allows for full harnessing of synergetic potential
as a result of lateral collaborations.
A 4-C is an independent logistic service provider (LSP) aiming to estab-
lish and orchestrate lateral collaborations between its clients. In full oper-
ation, it is responsible for (part of) the logistical activities of shippers that
are involved in a collaboration pact. In order to exploit synergetic potential,
schedules of these shippers need to be synchronized. This typically requires
shippers to deviate from their original schedules which causes them to ex-
perience inconvenience. Thus in essence, a 4-C faces the problem of finding
the optimal balance between supply chain costs and shipper’s inconvenience.
That is, shippers are only prepared to make large concessions if this results
in significant costs savings. This central trade-off between supply chain costs
and inconvenience forms the leading thread of our analysis. By introducing
an inconvenience cost function, we use mathematical programming to find
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optimal 4-C logistical solutions.
We suppose that a group of shippers has declared their willingness for
collaboration and our analysis focuses on transportation. Thus effectively,
collaboration boils down to consolidation of good flows of different shippers
which should be arranged by the 4-C in question. In this setting, we asso-
ciate for each shipper fixed pickup and delivery locations with corresponding
preferred pickup and delivery times. As pointed out, shippers will generally
have to deviate from these preferred times, i.e. inconvenience arises, in order
to make bundling of goods possible. Against this background, we propose
two modeling approaches: Transport Timetabling and Vehicle Routing. The
former is a simple model that purely deals with the time-dimension of vehicle
planning. Its job is to find an optimal tactical planning in a particular time-
horizon for a given transport connection. The second modeling approach is
more involved as it accounts for the routing aspect of vehicle planning as
well.
The notion of inconvenience is of crucial importance in our analysis. In
classical vehicle scheduling and routing problems, one often considers hard
time window constraints to model a preferred just-in-time delivery. However,
hard time windows clearly impede the possibility of freight consolidation, and
hence, we soften these constraints. Instead, we suggest to use an inconve-
nience cost function that models the degree of discomfort due to an off-time
delivery. Costs are typically associated with off-time delivery. Shippers will
incur extra storage costs when delivery occurs too early and shippers have to
reserve additional safety-stock to anticipate on possible stock-outs in case of
too late deliveries. The idea of this approach is that even considerable incon-
venience costs might be overcompensated by associated transportation costs
savings, leading to efficient logistical solutions that never can be obtained by
hard time window constraints.
Apart from determining optimal transport timetabling and vehicle rout-
ing, a 4-C is obliged with a fair distribution of obtained cost savings to
shippers participating in a collaboration pact. That is, shippers that con-
tribute more to total synergy should earn more from collaboration and vice
versa. To this end, suitable gain-sharing models should be applied, which in
fact forms an important driver of the success or failure of 4-C as a whole. It
turns out that establishing horizontal collaboration is, among other factors,
impeded by shipper’s distrust in constructing a fair allocation mechanism of
obtained savings (Cruijssen et al., 2007b). Due to its ease of practical use, it
might seem sensible to apply simple rules of thumb based on usual indicators,
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e.g. size of cargo or number of served customers, in determining a fair allo-
cation. However, its simpleness may sooner or later lead to dissatisfaction of
shippers feeling undervalued. It is therefore vital to deal with the notion of
fairness more explicitly. Cooperative game theory is a field of research that
describes fairness in a sensible way (Matsubayashi et al., 2005). Hence, we
suggest, in line with Cruijssen et al. (2010), to use game theoretical methods
in 4-C for suitable gain-sharing.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides
a literature review of related topics in supply chain collaboration, transport
timetabling, vehicle routing and gain sharing. Next, in section 2 we present
the mathematical model formulations for transport timetabling and vehicle
routing in Cross Chain Control Centers as well as theory with regard to
gain-sharing. Then in section 3, several test cases are considered in order to
establish the viability of proposed models. Finally, we summarize our main
findings and suggest directions for future work in section 4.
1.2. Related literature
Due to its recent introduction, to date no scientific literature is available
on 4-C explicitly. As an LSP, it ought to establish and manage lateral collab-
orations, which can enhance logistic performance significantly. Mason et al.
(2007) have conducted an assessment of three case studies to demonstrate
the advantages of taking a collaborative approach in both the vertical and
horizontal direction. In particular, factory gate pricing (FGP), i.e. the use of
an ex-works prices and the obligation of purchasers to manage freight trans-
port, gave (for example) UK retailers more control over inbound product
flows (Potter et al., 2006). This enabled consolidation of inbound product
flows of different suppliers, thereby reducing the mileage per product con-
siderably. These developments are catalyzed by rapid advances in ICT that
allow for coordination of multiple supply chains from a single point of control.
In this respect, the use of telematics, i.e. external control and monitoring of
vehicles via ICT, has gained ample attention (Pramatari et al., 2005).
As far as vehicle scheduling and routing is concerned, functionalities of
4-C have most prominent overlap with freight consolidation in horizontal
partnership. Cruijssen et al. (2007a) consider a situation where multiple
companies request freight distribution from a common center to different
customer locations. The concerning companies are prepared to collaborate
and order sets are known in advance that should be delivered in pre-specified
hard time windows. The authors have developed a routing heuristic, based
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on available VRP heuristics, to assess synergetic potential which is involved
in situations like these. Indeed, they demonstrate a considerable reduction
in transportation costs by joint route planning.
Transport timetabling concerns finding an efficient usage of resources in
a given tactical planning horizon. In modeling terms, this boils down to
discretizing a time-horizon and associating relevant decision variables with
each time element. For example, Salema et al. (2010) have proposed an elab-
orate modeling framework that combines strategic decisions with associated
planning of purchases, production, storage and distribution. The distribu-
tion planning determines optimal magnitudes of product flows in time while
striving to satisfy a time-dependent demand. Other well-known examples of
transport timetabling involve time-space networks, where the physical repre-
sentation of a supply chain is replicated for each time element. Time-space
models are popular in tactical decision making, in arranging e.g. public bus
transport (Kliewer et al., 2006), airline scheduling (Hane et al., 1995) and
disaster relief operations (Haghani, 1996).
In arranging vehicle routing, a 4-C should find optimal routing between
various pickup and delivery locations. This job constitutes a classical Vehicle
Routing Problem with Pickups and Deliveries (VRPPD). In fact, VRPPD is
a generalization of VRP, where all customer request have a common pickup
location. VRPPD can roughly be subdivided into three classes of problems,
i.e. Pickup and Delivery Vehicle Routing Problem (PDVRP), Pickup and
Delivery Problem (PDP) and Dial-A-Ride Problem (DARP) (Parragh et al.,
2008). PDVRP refers to problems where pickup and delivery locations are
unpaired. That is, each commodity that is picked can be used to satisfy
customer’s demand at delivery locations. In contrast, PDP and DARP sup-
pose fixed pairs of pickup and delivery locations implicitly demanding that
these are visited by the same vehicle. DARP deals with efficient design of
vehicle routing for passenger transportation where for instance passenger’s
discomfort due to long travel times is taken into account (Cordeau and La-
porte, 2003). On the other hand, the classical PDP describes transportation
of cargo and its generalization accounting for time windows, i.e. PDPTW,
is widely considered in operations research literature (Dumas et al., 1991;
Ropke and Cordeau, 2009). Numerous variants of these three VRPPD de-
scendants exists, e.g. with or without time windows, single or multiple vehi-
cles, each with a specific model formulation. For a detailed overview of all
these variants, see Parragh et al. (2008).
In the preceding, it was motivated to use cooperative game theoretical
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methods in assessing a fair way of gain distribution in 4-C. Cooperative
games are a special class of games where groups of players, called coalitions,
may engage in cooperation. The players are the shippers that collaborate
and each coalition is a subset of the grand coalition, i.e. the collection of all
collaborating shippers. Each coalition is characterized by a specific extend
to which profit can be achieved (Curiel, 1997). Allocation rules dictate how
profit of the grand coalition should be subdivided to participants by taking
the profit of all these coalitions into consideration. Some well-known alloca-
tion rules are the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), the nucleolus (Schmeidler,
1969) and the compromise value (Tys, 1981). In identifying the appropriate
allocation rule, several fairness criteria play an important role. Individual
fairness states that a player should receive at least as much as he can gen-
erate on its own. This implies that a shipper will never have to pay for
collaboration, otherwise he wont participate. Symmetry imposes that two
players, who generate the same additional value to any coalition, should re-
ceive the same share. This makes sense since the only intrinsic difference
between two shippers is how much savings they can generate. Finally, strong
monotonicity states that a player’s pay-off solely depends monotonically on
its marginal contribution when entering a coalition. This means that if for
some reason the added value of a specific shipper increases for each coalition
he is part of, his pay-off should also increase and vice versa. These three
fairness criteria make perfect sense in the case of collaborating shippers and
it is shown that the Shapley value is the only allocation rule that satisfies
these criteria (Young, 1985). This makes it sensible to use the Shapley value
as the appropriate gain-sharing model in 4-C.
2. Theory
Central to the study at hand is the notion of inconvenience, which models
the degree of a shipper’s discomfort associated with deviating from it’s orig-
inal schedule. In this respect, we introduce an inconvenience cost function
to quantify this degree of inconvenience.
Let us suppose a group of shippers M , indexed by m, that have expressed
their willingness for collaboration. Now consider a time horizon T , in which
each shipper m requests a transport at time t ∈ T of size dt,m to be deliv-
ered. The partnership is characterized by specific moments τ ∈ T when the
actual consolidated delivery occurs. In general for shipper m, time of actual
delivery is unequal to time of this delivery’s request, i.e. t ̸= τ , giving rise to
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inconvenience Inτ,t,m, given by:
Inτ,t,m = icfm (τ, t) (1)
where icfm (τ, t) is the inconvenience cost function of shipper m. The exact
form of icfm (τ, t) should be specified by the business modeler, however it
is natural to assume a monotonically increasing function with the difference
|τ − t|.
2.1. Transport timetabling: TT4C
The problem of Transport Timetabling in Cross Chain Control Centers
(TT4C) is based on the assumption that shippers have common pickup and
delivery locations. Evidently, this is strictly an unrealistic assumption, how-
ever different pickup as well as delivery locations are considered to be suf-
ficiently close to each other such that the distances among those can be
neglected compared to the distance between pickup to delivery locations.
This assumption eliminates the spatial dimension of the problem and we
only have to determine when a vehicle should be used for transport. As a
result, the required functionality can be described by a rather simple model
formulation. In section 2.2 we propose a more elaborate model that is no
longer based on this assumption.
In order to solve TT4C, we propose a mixed-integer linear programming
formulation. Let the binary variable Zτ,t,m be equal to 1 if delivery request
at time t of shipper m is delivered at time τ and be equal to 0 otherwise.
Secondly, the positive integer variable Yτ denotes the number of trucks that
accommodates delivery at time τ . Now, TT4C is formulated by:




τ Zτ,t,m = 1 ∀ (t,m) |dt,m ̸= 0 (3)∑
t,m Zτ,t,mdt,m ≤ QYτ ∀τ (4)
Yτ ∈ Z+ ∀τ (5)
Zτ,t,m ∈ {0, 1} ∀τ, t,m (6)
The objective of TT4C (2) minimizes the sum of total inconvenience (CtotalIn )
and transportation (CtotalTr ) costs, which depend linearly on the decision vari-
ables. Constraint (3) ensures that each non-zero freight delivery request is
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satisfied. Secondly, constraint (4) imposes that the transported freight is
restricted to the vehicle capacity Q.
Total inconvenience costs CtotalIn is related to Inτ,t,m, by the definition of
the inconvenience cost function one is using. That is, if total inconvenience





On the other hand, if inconvenience is due to a too early or tardy delivery per
unit of freight size, the right-hand side of equation (7) should be multiplied
by dt,m.
For the sake of simplicity, it suffices to assume that total transportation






In a more realistic approach, transportation costs are incurred per unit of
freight. Total transportation costs as paid by shippers are typically given
by a concave cost function due to economies of scale and volume discounting
(Guisewite and Pardalos, 1990). The formulation of TT4C can readily be ex-
tended as to account for this feature by e.g. a piece-wise linear approximation
(Stratila, 2002).
2.2. Vehicle routing: VR4C
In the previous section, it was shortly noted that the central assumption of
treating pickup and delivery locations of different shippers as common begin
and end points is strictly unrealistic. In this section, we relax this assumption
and consider the routing aspect of vehicle planning in the context of 4-C.
Again delivery requests are given by dt,m, yet each shipper is associated with
a specific pickup and delivery location and a 4-C has to determine the optimal
routing between all those. The crux of this problem is that consolidation of
goods generates costs savings, but from an individual shipper’s perspective,
it requires vehicles to make a detour in serving the other shippers as well. As
a result, the individual shippers will typically experience inconvenience due
to early or tardy delivery. Hence, the optimal routing strives to make delivery
request times and travel times compatible as to prevent this inconvenience.
The problem at hand is referred to as Vehicle Routing in Cross Chain
Control Centers (VR4C). It integrates elements of the previously addressed
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TT4C and the classical PDP. As far as pure routing is concerned, we follow
conventional notation (see e.g. Parragh et al. (2008); Cordeau (2006)).
Each shipper m ∈ M has a corresponding pickup and delivery loca-
tion. We define the directed graph G = (N,A) with a node set N =
{0, 1, . . . , n, n+ 1, . . . , 2n, 2n+ 1} and arc set A, thus n = |M |. The nodes
1, . . . , n constitute the set of pickup locations P whereas the set of delivery
locations D consists of the nodes n+1, . . . , 2n. Nodes 0 and 2n+1 represent
an origin and a destination depot respectively. In addition, let Pm and Dm
respectively include the pickup and delivery location belonging to shipper m
and let Θi ⊂ M return the shipper for which i is either a pickup or delivery
location.
With each node i, we associate a service time Si representing the time
needed for loading or unloading freight at this particular node.
LetK denote the set of vehicles, indexed by k, where vehicles are assumed
to be identical, each with capacity Q. Each arc (i, j) ∈ A is characterized
by transportation costs ci,j and travel time Ti,j, which are related to the
Euclidean distance between nodes i and j.
The model VR4C is characterized by four types of descriptive decision
variables. First, the binary xi,j,k equals 1 if vehicle k travels directly from
node i to node j and equals 0 otherwise. Then, Qi,k ∈ R+ denotes the size
of the load of vehicle k upon leaving node i. Next, the binary variable Wi,k,τ
is equal to 1 if vehicle k visits node i and arrives at time τ and 0 otherwise.
Lastly, the binary Uk,t,m equals 1 if vehicle k serves delivery request dt,m and
0 otherwise.
As with TT4C, the objective of VR4C is to minimize the sum of total






We only consider inconvenience at the delivery locations, and hence, the time
t of dt,m corresponds to the preferred delivery time. The first term of the
objective function is nonlinear, which can readily be linearized using standard
reformulation techniques.
In order to ensure that every transport request is satisfied, the following
constraint applies: ∑
k Uk,t,m = 1 ∀ (t,m) |dt,m ̸= 0. (10)
If a vehicle is used to serve a particular shipperm, it should visit this shipper’s
9
pickup and delivery location:∑
t Uk,t,m∈Θi ≤ M
∑
j|j ̸=i xi,j,k ∀i ∈ P ∪D, k (11)∑
j|j ̸=i xi,j,k ≤
∑
t Uk,t,m∈Θi ∀i ∈ P ∪D, k (12)
where M is a large number. Each route should start at node 0 and end at
node 2n+ 1, which is imposed by:∑
j x0,j,k ≤ 1 ∀k (13)∑
i xi,2n+1,k ≤ 1 ∀k. (14)
As is typical for vehicle routing problems, each route should satisfy flow
conservation and the possibility of subtour formation should be eliminated:∑
j|j ̸=i xi,j,k −
∑
j|j ̸=i xj,i,k = 0 ∀i ∈ P ∪D, k (15)
ui,k − uj,k + (|N | − 1)xi,j,k ≤ |N | − 2 ∀ (i, j) ∈ P ∪D, i ̸= j, k (16)
where ui,k ∈ R is a technical variable. There should be consistency between
the arrival times at the different nodes of a specific route and the variable
xi,j,k describing this route:∑
j x0,j,k =
∑
τ W0,k,τ ∀k (17)
Wj,k,τ+Ti,j+Si ≥ Wi,k,τxi,j,k ∀i, j, k, τ. (18)
Constraint (18) contains the product of two binary variables, which can be
reformulated in a linearized way. Characteristic for PDP type problems is
that corresponding pickup and delivery nodes are visited by the same vehicle
and in the correct sequence, which is ensured by:∑
τ ordτWi∈Dm,k,τ ≥
∑
τ ordτWi∈Pm,k,τ + Ti∈Pm,j∈Dm + Si∈Pm ∀k,m.(19)
where ordτ returns the ordinal element of index τ in set T . Finally, the
routing given by xi,j,k should be consistent with the loading variable Qi,k,
which in turn is restricted to the vehicle’s capacity:
Qj,k ≥ Qi,k +
∑
t Uk,t,m∈Θjdt,m∈Θj −M (1− xi,j,k) ∀i ∈ P ∪D ∪ 0, j ∈ P, k(20)
Qj,k ≥ Qi,k −
∑
t Uk,t,m∈Θjdt,m∈Θj −M (1− xi,j,k) ∀i ∈ P ∪D, j ∈ D, k(21)
Qi,k ≤ Q ∀i, k. (22)
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Constraints (20) and (21) are linearized reformulations of the usual loading
consistency constraints, see e.g. Ropke and Cordeau (2009). Note that this
linearized formulation strictly incorrectly models the actual loading at a par-
ticular node since, if xi,j,k = 1, the load when leaving j can be larger than
the load at i plus the picked up or delivered load at j. However, in com-
bination with constraint (22) it introduces a new vehicle once a particular
freight size can not be loaded anymore, which is it’s actual purpose rather
than monitoring the actual load of a vehicle when leaving a node.
2.3. Extension: Convenience by a 4-C
Both TT4C and VR4C model the central trade-off between inconvenience
and transportation costs. In this respect, we assume that deviating from an
original schedule always generates inconvenience. However there are situa-
tions thinkable where this might not be the case. To see this, let us consider
a simple situation where two shippers request transport according to Fig.
1a. We observe that shipper A delivers every two days a freight of about
85% of the vehicle capacity whereas shipper B delivers a large freight at just
two moments in the time-horizon. There is only synergy associated with this
situation if we allow the freight of shipper B to be split up. In this case, the
large volume of B may be distributed over the rest capacity of A, thereby
saving the four vehicles needed for B, see Fig. 1b.
In the combined schedule of Fig. 1b, the time discrepancy between re-
quest and actual delivery for shipper B is still considered as inconvenience.
However, this may be questionable. Some shippers may actually prefer their
freight being transported in smaller batches and at a higher frequency, e.g.
because of lower inventory levels, but will not do this due to high associated
transportation costs. Thus, rather than that shipper B experiences inconve-
nience, it may experience convenience, apart from the reduced transporta-
tion costs. In fact, this demonstrates a two-fold beneficial operation of a 4-C
where transportation costs decreases and the delivery frequency increases.
11













































Figure 1: Simple two shipper situation, where vehicle capacity = 200.
In order to describe this convenience effect by 4-C, we subdivide the ship-
per set M into MIn and MCo. The first still includes the shippers that expe-
rience inconvenience due to off-time delivery whereas the latter set includes
the shippers that actually prefer delivery at higher frequency. The decision
variable Zτ,t,m for m ∈ MCo should be continuous in the interval [0, 1] since
freight sizes should be able to be split up. If Zτ,t,m for m ∈ MCo is non-zero,
the indicator Aτ,t,m equals 1 and 0 otherwise. Next, the binary variable Bf,m
equals 1 if there are f number of deliveries for transport requests of shipper
m and 0 otherwise.
Convenience measures the degree of comfort associated with delivery over
more periods. Depending solely on the number of deliveries f and the shipper
m in question, it is given by:
Cof,m = ccfm (f) (23)
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where ccfm (f) is the convenience cost function of shipper m. This cost
function typically decreases for small f due to reduced inventory costs and
increases for large f due to costs associated per delivery, e.g. production-
setup costs or shipment-handling costs.
Using the additional variables and the convenience parameter, both TT4C
and VR4C can be extended as to account for the convenience effect. We will
give its formulation and present results for TT4C explicitly, that is TT4C
with Convenience is formulated by:
TT4CwC = min
∑







τ Zτ,t,m = 1 ∀ (t,m) |dt,m ̸= 0 (25)∑
t,m Zτ,t,mdt,m ≤ QYτ ∀τ (26)
Zτ,t,m ≤ MAτ,t,m ∀τ, t,m ∈ MCo (27)
ρAτ,t,m ≤ Zτ,t,m ∀τ, t,m ∈ MCo (28)∑
τ,t Aτ,t,m =
∑
f ordfBf,m ∀m ∈ MCo (29)∑
f Bf,m = 1 ∀m ∈ MCo (30)
Yτ ∈ Z+ ∀τ (31)
Zτ,t,m ∈ {0, 1} ∀τ, t,m ∈ MIn (32)
Zτ,t,m ∈ [0, 1] ∀τ, t,m ∈ MCo (33)
Aτ,t,m ∈ {0, 1} ∀τ, t,m ∈ MCo (34)
Bf,m ∈ {0, 1} ∀f,m ∈ MCo (35)
where ρ indicates the minimum fraction of freight that should be transported
in case of delivery. The objective (24) is extended with the convenience term.
Note that we can still associate some form of inconvenience for shippers
m ∈ MCo in the first term of (24). Constraints (25) and (26) have the same
functionality as in TT4C. Next, constraints (27) and (28) link Zτ,t,m correctly
to its indicator Aτ,t,m while ensuring a minimal fraction of transported freight.
Then constraints (29) and (30) count the number of delivery moments serving
m ∈ MCo and set the variable Bf,m accordingly. The last five constraints
mark the domains of the different decision variables.
The formulation of TT4CwC does not impose that the split up moments
of delivery are equally spaced in the concerning time-horizon. From a prac-
tical point-of-view, this might be desirable otherwise the model may for in-
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stance output to delivery at exactly consecutive days, which typically does
not generate much convenience. In order to let the delivery moments be






|T | − ordτ
)
Aτ,t,m ≥ 0 (36)
which via an additional constraint should be non-negative. By minimizing
this term the average of the delivery moments tends to 1
2
|T |, and hence,
delivery moments tend to be equally spaced.
2.4. Gain Sharing
It was motivated that cooperative game theory provides a method to re-
distribute obtained savings in a fair way. To this end, we need some game
theoretical terminology. Let 2M be the collection of all subsets of M , rep-
resenting coalitions that may engage in cooperative behavior. The trans-
portation costs savings that can be obtained by coalition S ∈ 2M is given by




Cm − CS, 0
)
(37)
where Cm denotes the costs for shipper m if he operates individually and
CS denotes the joint costs for coalition S. Secondly, we let vIn(S) denote
the total costs of inconvenience when shippers m ∈ S collaborate. In case
shippers express to prefer delivery over more periods, a cost savings due to







m )− ccfm(f colm ), 0
)
(38)
where f indm and f
col
m are the number of deliveries when shipper m respectively
operates individually or engages in collaboration.
The Shapley value was recognized to be an appropriate allocation rule,
determining a fair division of transportation and convenience costs savings
14




|S|! (|M |!− |S| − 1)
|M |!
[v(S ∪m)− v(S)] . (39)
For an elaborate discussion on the exact interpretation of the Shapley value,
see e.g. (Shapley, 1953; Cruijssen et al., 2010). The Shapley value satisfies
additivity (Curiel, 1997), implying that the nett savings distribution is simply
given by: ϕ = ϕTr + ϕCo − ϕIn.
3. Results
In order to test the proposed models, we will consider several test cases.
As pointed out, the inconvenience cost function should be determined by
the modeler, perhaps by accounting for additional storage costs. The exact
specification of icfm (τ, t) lies beyond the scope of this paper, however it was
suggested to be a monotonically increasing function with |τ − t|. In the test
cases, we take icfm (τ, t) = αm (τ − t)2, with αm a shipper specific parameter.
Thus, discomfort due to an early or tardy delivery is equally valued.
3.1. Transport Timetabling in 4-C
In a 50-day time horizon, we simulated requests of freight transportation
for three shippers (A, B and C). Both the interval length between deliver-
ies and the freight size are randomly chosen from a log-normal distribution
according to the specifications of Table 1.
Shipper Interval Freight size
A 3 (1) 95 (20)
B 8 (0.5) 115 (25)
C 14 (0) 125 (35)
Table 1: Freight transport request specifications. The number in brackets
gives the standard deviation.
3.1.1. Optimal schedules
With dt,m being simulated, we have determined the optimal combined
schedules using TT4C, solved with CPLEX. We assume that inconvenience
solely stems from a too early or too tardy delivery regardless of the freight
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seize, hence equation (8) applies. Figure 2 shows obtained optimal sched-
ules for three values of αm, i.e. inconvenience is equally valued by the three
shippers in question.
If αm is relatively high, inconvenience is dominant resulting in the opti-
mal schedule of Fig. 2a. This schedule invokes no shipper’s inconvenience,
and hence, is effectively the same as input dt,m. As αm decreases and in-
convenience becomes relatively less important, it becomes advantageous to
consolidate freight transport of different days, see Figs. 2b and 2c. As a
result, transportation costs decreases accordingly and outweighs increasing
inconvenience as to minimize the objective (eqn. (2)). Moreover, better ve-
hicle capacity utilization is witnessed by delivery sizes tending to a multiple
of Q.
16

















 Shipper A    Shipper B    Shipper C
(a) αm = 10. C
total
Tr = 270, C
total
In = 0


















(b) αm = 1. C
total
Tr = 200, C
total
In = 15


















(c) αm = 0.30. C
total
Tr = 170, C
total
In = 18.9
Figure 2: The optimal combined schedules for three different αm. Other
parameters: Cv = 10 and Q = 200.
Suppose a fourth shipper D joints the collaboration pact that transports
once a freight of size 185 at day 25, but actually prefers delivery over more
periods. Thus, shipper D forms a source of convenience cost savings, and
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hence, we apply TT4CwC. It was motivated that the convenience cost func-
tion should decrease for small f and increase for larger f . In this case, we
choose: ccfD(f) = 100f
−1 + 4f , which has its minimum at f = 5. Figure 3
shows the optimal combined schedule for αm∈MCo = 1.










 Shipper A   Shipper B 













Figure 3: The optimal combined schedule found with TT4CwC for the sit-
uation of Fig. 2b plus shipper D that generates convenience cost savings.
CTr = 190, CIn = 25 and CCo = 40
.
In Figure 3 we observe that the single transport of shipper D is split
up over 5 delivery moments, i.e. the number of deliveries where ccfD(f) is
minimal. As with Fig. 2b total inconvenience and transport costs add up to
215, however there is an additional convenience costs savings of ccfD(1) −
ccfD(5) = 64. Moveover, one saves the additional truck originally needed for
shipper D. Thus, the combined schedule of Figure 3 is clearly reminiscent of
a two-fold beneficial operation of 4-C.
In the example of Fig. 3 the total transportation costs reduced from
340 when shippers operate individually to 190 when they operate jointly
at the expense of 25 of inconvenience costs while in addition a convenience
cost savings of 64 is obtained. In the next section, we determine how to
redistribute the obtained savings and costs in a fair way.
3.1.2. Distributing savings and costs
For the test case of the previous section, Table 2 shows obtained trans-
portation costs savings, inconvenience costs and convenience costs savings
per coalition S. Evidently, vCo (S) can only be non-zero if D ∈ S. Appar-
ently, in all but {C,D}, the optimal solution dictates to exploit convenience
costs savings maximally, i.e. f colD = 5. In {C,D}, shipper C only delivers
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three times, and hence, f colD = 3. Thus, exploiting convenience costs savings
further does overcompensate the use of additional vehicles.
The Shapley values of the three concerning costs factors read via equa-
tion (39): ϕTr = (84.2; 29.2; 19.1; 17.5), ϕIn = (11.0; 7.0; 4.3; 2.7) and ϕCo =
(5.8; 5.8; 4.9; 47.5). Thus, nett savings are distributed among the three ship-
pers according to: ϕ = (79.0; 28.0; 19.7; 62.3). We observe that shippers A
and D should receive most from obtained savings, which is in line with intu-
ition as A provides the most bundling potential and D is a source of significant
convenience cost savings. In accordance, shipper B receives more than C as
the former provides more unused vehicle capacity to the collaboration pact.
S {A} {B} {C} {D} {A,B}
vTr 0 0 0 0 120
vIn 0 0 0 0 20
vCo 0 0 0 0 0
S {A,C} {A,D} {B,C} {B,D} {C,D}
vTr 110 100 20 20 10
vIn 19 18 9 1 0
vCo 0 64 0 64 58.7
S {A,B,C} {A,B,D} {A,C,D} {B,C,D} {A,B,C,D}
vTr 130 130 110 30 150
vIn 15 20 13 9 25
vCo 0 64 64 64 64
Table 2: Transportation costs savings, inconvenience costs and convenience
costs savings for each S ⊂ 2M .
It is interesting to investigate the effect of inconvenience on distributed
savings. To this end, let us return to the three shipper situation of Figure 2.
We make inconvenience for shipper A relatively more important by gradually
increasing αA while keeping αB and αC fixed and investigating the effect on
the Shapley value. Figure 4a shows the gross gain distribution ϕTr as a
function of αA for A, B and C. As αA is gradually increasing, the optimal
schedule tends to conform more and more to the original schedule of shipper
A. The instantaneous jumps in Fig. 4b correspond to changes in the optimal
combined schedule. From αA ∼ 1.75, the original schedule of A is completely
restored and the combined schedule does not change anymore. In addition,
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the relative share of shipper A decreases at the expense of increasing share
of B and C, see Fig. 4b. As A incurs more inconvenience costs, it contributes
less to synergy and consequently should receive relatively less from obtained
savings.














































Figure 4: Gross gain (a) and share of nett gain distribution (b) as a function
of αA for αB = αC = 0.3.
3.2. Vehicle Routing in 4-C
To demonstrate the proper operation of VR4C, let us consider a three
shipper (A, B and C) situation which request freight transportation from
the north to the south of the Netherlands. More precisely, the time horizon
encompasses a 16-hour period (06.00 - 22.00) and the three shippers in ques-
tion request transport as detailed in Table 3 and service at each locations is









A Groningen Maastricht 11.00, 15.00 50, 50
B Assen Breda 12.30, 19.00 65, 65
C Leeuwarden Nijmegen 16.30 80
Table 3: Specifications of transportation requests of shipper A, B and C.
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With the input transportation requests of the three shippers given by
Table 3, we have determined the optimal routing and schedules for various
values of αm and ci,j = 10 · Ti,j, Q = 200, see Figs. 5 to 7. The caption of
each routing indicates which transportation requests of Table 3 are served.
Figure 5 depicts the optimal solution for relatively high αm, i.e. inconve-
nience costs are dominant. As a result, it requires four vehicles for the five
transportation requests to ensure on-time delivery. In fact, only one vehicle
transports a consolidated freight invoking slight inconvenience for shipper B
due to a too early delivery.
(a) Truck 1: [A,11.00] (b) Truck 2: [B,19.00]
(c) Truck 3: [C,16.30] (d) Truck 4: [A,15.00],
[B,12.30]
Figure 5: The optimal vehicle routing for αm = 20 resulting in the use of
four trucks.
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If αm becomes smaller, transportation costs start to become more impor-
tant, and hence, the routes of truck 3 and 4 of Fig. 5 are combined, see Fig.
6. At first sight, truck 3 seems to travel a rather striking route. It makes
an evident detour in visiting successively Breda, Maastricht and Nijmegen.
However, this particular route demonstrates in essence the strength of VR4C
as it makes travel times and preferred arrival times more compatible. As a
result it generates little inconvenience, but still requires the use of a single
truck leading to an efficient logistical solution.
(a) Truck 1: [A,11.00] (b) Truck 2: [B,19.00] (c) Truck 3: [A,15.00],
[B,12.30], [C,16.30]
Figure 6: The optimal vehicle routing for αm = 10 resulting in the use of
three vehicles.
In the case αm = 1 no further consolidation is possible due to the vehicle
capacity resulting in the use of two trucks, see Fig. 7. As transportation
costs are dominant, a truck travels the fastest route visiting the pickup and
delivery locations, which are assigned to this truck. Consequently, the op-
timal solution tends to consolidate freight delivery requested by the same
shipper. In Fig. 7, the two requests of shipper A are combined rather than
the two requests of B. This is due an inconvenience effect as the difference in
preferred arrival times of B is larger than of A, and hence, the two requests
of B are delivered by two different trucks.
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(a) Truck 1: [A,11.00],
[A,15.00], [B,12.30]
(b) Truck 2: [B,19.00],
[C,16.30]
Figure 7: The optimal vehicle routing for αm = 1 resulting in the use of two
vehicles.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have described the role of a Cross Chain Control Center
(4-C) in satisfying the growing need for efficient supply chain orchestration.
As an LSP, its task is to manage and control multiple supply chains simul-
taneously.
While considering transportation, we have proposed a methodology al-
lowing a 4-C to arrange vehicle planning for a group of shippers that are
willing to collaborate. As different shippers have typically different preferred
delivery times, a 4-C should find a logistical solution requiring shippers to
deviate from their original schedules in order to make freight consolidation
possible. In this respect, we introduced the notion of inconvenience to cap-
ture the degree of this required deviation. It is believed that deviating causes
shippers to incur costs which is modeled by an inconvenience cost function.
Central to the study at hand is the trade-off between transportation and
inconvenience costs. We considered two optimization models that describe
this trade-off. The first, Transport Timetabling in Cross Chain Control Cen-
ters (TT4C), is based on the assumption that shippers have the similar pickup
and delivery locations thereby ignoring the spatial dimension of vehicle plan-
ning. This situation can be described by a simple and effective model to
construct a common tactical planning, to which shippers should conform. In
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a simple test case, we saw that allowing more inconvenience correctly results
in more enforcement of synergetic potential and vice versa.
The second model is more complex as it accounts for vehicle routing as
well. That is, the model produces the optimal routing that vehicles should
travel between the different pickup and delivery locations of collaborating
shippers. In line with intuition, we correctly find that the model aims to
make preferred delivery times and travel times compatible as to minimize
the extend of inconvenience.
We recognized the possibility of generating convenience by a 4-C. In a
collaboration pact, it might be possible that the freight size of a shipper
is split up and delivered over multiple periods which actually satisfies his
preference. This effect allows for a two-fold beneficial operation of 4-C, i.e.
reduced transportation costs and enhanced delivery frequencies. We cap-
tured the convenience effect by introducing a convenience cost function and
demonstrated the two-fold beneficial operation via a test case.
An apparent downside of the proposed models is their mixed-integer na-
ture, which makes them NP-hard. As a consequence, computation times
may be impractical when input-data sets become larger. It may therefore be
interesting to investigate whether heuristics can be developed, perhaps by
integrating the notion of inconvenience into existing PDP-heuristics.
Lastly, we did not pay attention to the exact form of the inconvenience
cost function. In order to let the proposed methodology work in practice
the inconvenience cost function should be specified in agreement with the
shipper in question. In this respect, a 4-C may suggest several different
forms of the inconvenience cost function and present the corresponding cost
savings that can be obtained, perhaps by accounting for additional inventory
storage costs. A shipper may subsequently decide how much inconvenience
it allows in return for prospected savings.
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